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Macro Markets and Financial 
Security 
Stefano Athanasoulis, Robert Shiller, and Eric van Wincoop 
oday, people have a rich set of investment
options, ranging from low-risk money market
instruments to high-risk growth stocks. They
can choose to invest in mutual funds, hedge
funds, and pension plans. They can hedge themselves with
options and other derivatives while investing both at home
and across the globe. Plenty of opportunities are available for
diversifying their portfolios and avoiding excess exposure to
sectoral or geographic risk. Nonetheless, there is good reason
to believe that most people’s wealth is not well diversified.
For example, although investors can diversify through
equity markets, corporate profits account for less than
10 percent of national income. That figure suggests that
about 90 percent of an average person’s income is sensitive to
sectoral, occupational, and geographic uncertainty.
Shiller (1993) has proposed a new set of markets
that could in theory provide much better diversification
opportunities. These so-called macro markets would be
large international markets trading, in the form of futures
contracts, long-term claims on major components of
incomes shared by a large number of people or organiza-
tions. For example, in a macro market for the United
States, an investor could buy a claim on the U.S. national
income and then receive, for as long as the claim is held,
dividends equal to a specified fraction of U.S. national
income. Such a claim is comparable to a share in a corpo-
ration, except that the dividend would equal a share
of national income rather than a share of corporate
profits. Such markets might exist for entire countries—
the United States, Japan, and Brazil—or for regions—
such as the European Union and North America. Even a
market for claims on the combined incomes of the entire
world could be formed. Prices would rise and fall in
these markets as new information about national,
regional, or global economies became available, just as
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prices rise and fall in the stock market as new information
about corporate profits is revealed.
The potential future importance of these markets
is supported by the most basic principle of finance—
diversification. People could use macro markets to
hedge their own national income risks and to invest in
the rest of the world. This investment strategy would
reduce income growth uncertainty and lead to a more
secure financial future.
We address several questions in this paper. First,
how could macro markets be useful to the average person?
Second, how large are the potential benefits from diver-
sification if these markets were to be introduced and
used optimally? Third, can existing financial markets
achieve a similar degree of diversification when used opti-
mally? Fourth, why don’t these markets already exist?
HOW WOULD INVESTORS USE 
MACRO MARKETS?
The basic idea behind macro markets is a simple one.
Consider the case of claims on national income. If macro
markets existed for every country of the world, people
could take short positions in their country’s market,
thereby hedging their own country’s risk, and long posi-
tions in the markets of all other countries in proportion
to each country’s size, thereby completely hedging them-
selves. The short positions in their home country would
exactly offset the long positions that they hold by virtue
of living there, and the long positions in the world would
mean that they were completely diversified. If everyone
hedged risk in this way, it would all add up, that is, for
every long in every country there would be a short, and
demand would equal supply in each macro market. The
dividends paid on the securities for each country would
be paid by the people who live in that country and hold
short positions. By definition, these people can always
make the payments because they are earning the national
income upon which the dividends are drawn.
Taking such positions in these markets is the best
way for an individual to achieve diversification. After
hedging, everyone earns a share of global income. It would
be impossible for individuals to lower their risks any further.
It is impossible for everyone to diversify away uncertainty
about global income, because total income earned across all
individuals equals global income itself.
RETAIL INSTITUTIONS
Of course, most people are not accustomed to hedging.
Thus, it would probably be unrealistic to expect the aver-
age person to hedge through macro markets without the
assistance of intermediaries. Most people are familiar with
insurance, and they readily buy insurance against other
risks. Retail institutions, such as pension funds or insur-
ance companies, could offer people contracts to hedge their
aggregate income risk. These insurance companies and
pension funds would trade in macro markets to sell off the
risk incurred by writing the contracts in retail markets.
These institutional investors would be hedging, much as
institutions now hedge in stock index futures markets.
AN AVERAGE INVESTOR
We will now give an example of how these markets and
retail institutions could serve the individual investor. Con-
sider a person who earns income from wages and from
returns on financial assets (such as stocks and bonds). The
individual cares about the uncertainty of the future value of
his or her total wealth, which is the sum of the future value
of financial assets and the future value of ‘‘human capital.’’
The value of human capital is equal to the present value of
the stream of future wages earned by the individual. The
value of the person’s wealth can thus be written as 
,
where  PDV is present discounted value,   represents
the annual dividends and interest earned from financial
assets, and W is wages plus noncorporate business
income. Even if the individual were well diversified in
the equity and bond markets, he or she would still be
exposed to uncertainty associated with wages earned.
Because wages plus noncorporate profits are at least nine
times as great as corporate profits (in national income
accounts), the largest component of wealth remains
undiversified.
Let us further assume that the wealth of the indi-
vidual is ‘‘average’’—the value of the individual’s financial
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assets is average and his or her wages are equal to the average
wage rate in the country plus an idiosyncratic component.
The idiosyncratic component of wages depends on individual-
specific effort as well as a dose of good or bad luck. Insuring
against the idiosyncratic component is impossible because of
moral hazard problems. If an individual were insured against
all uncertainty about future wages, he or she would have
little incentive to work hard and to put effort into a success-
ful career. Given these assumptions, the value of wages is
written as  , where   is the average wage
rate in the country, and   is the idiosyncratic component.
The sum of the idiosyncratic component over all individuals
is zero. Moral hazard problems do not apply to insuring one-
self against uncertainty about   because the individual
has little control over the average wage rate earned in the
country as a whole.
We also assume that the individual invests only in
domestic stocks and bonds and that he or she is well diver-
sified domestically. The absence of international diversifi-
cation is not far from current practice: Japanese and U.S.
investors hold at least 90 percent of their equity portfolio
in domestic assets.1 Because the individual’s financial
assets are average, the dividends earned on these assets,  ,
are equal to the per capita value of total corporate profits in
the country. We can then write the individual’s wealth as
 , 
where  GDP is per capita gross domestic product, which
equals  . Wealth is therefore equal to the present
discounted value of future per capita GDP plus the present
discounted value of the idiosyncratic component of wages.
Macro markets can be used to insure the uncertainty associ-
ated with per capita GDP.
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As a matter of simplification, assume that the
expected future per capita GDP of the country in which
the individual resides is equal to that for the world as a
whole   and that the ‘‘riskiness’’ of the country’s
future GDP is average. We will be more precise about what
that means in a moment. Insurance companies and pension
funds can allow people to hedge uncertainty about the
country’s per capita GDP by offering a hedging instrument
with a yearly payoff of  . As we explain
below, the price of this hedging instrument is zero.
Although the expected payoff is zero, the actual payoff can
be both positive or negative. If it is negative, the individ-
ual must make a payment. If the hedging instrument is
offered by a pension fund, the payment could be made
through a debit on the individual’s account at the pension
fund. This contract is attractive to a risk-averse individual
because he or she will lose on the hedging contract only
when the domestic economy is doing unexpectedly well.
The individual will receive positive payments from the
contract when the economy’s performance is unexpectedly
poor. If the individual opts to use this instrument, his or
her net wealth will be
 . 
The individual clearly gains by hedging in macro markets
to the extent that less uncertainty surrounds the growth rate
of world output than the growth rate of the home country’s
output.
Notice that in our example the individual invests
only in domestic financial assets, then hedges uncertainty
about both domestic financial returns and domestic wages
through the hedging instrument. This investment strategy
is attractive because it avoids the need to make decisions
about investment in foreign financial assets. The problem of
asymmetric information means that domestic investors are at
a disadvantage relative to foreign investors when evaluating
foreign stocks and bonds. Foreign investors tend to be better
informed about companies trading in their own stock mar-
kets, particularly in the case of smaller companies. They can
therefore adjust their portfolio more rapidly than domestic
investors as new information becomes available to them.
Gehrig (1993) shows that investors are reluctant to invest
abroad if foreign investors receive a more precise price signal
GDPW ()
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about foreign stock returns than domestic investors.
Asymmetric information is one of the most common
explanations for the lack of observed international diver-
sification in equity and bond markets. In macro markets,
which are tied to aggregate incomes, asymmetric infor-
mation is much less of a concern. Japanese investors are
not likely to predict Japanese GDP growth rates more
accurately than U.S. investors because the information
needed to make such predictions is publicly available.
The diversification strategy outlined above is
different from the type of diversification most investors are
accustomed to. Most individual stock market investors
diversify by investing their money in a wide basket of assets.
With macro markets, diversification is achieved instead
through a hedging contract.
PRICING IN MACRO MARKETS
So far we have left two issues unaddressed. First, the insti-
tutional investors that offer the hedging contract we just
described will themselves be exposed to risk when offering
the instrument. Second, we have yet to explain why the
price of the contract will be zero. To understand how insti-
tutional investors will lay off the risk and what factors
determine prices, we describe in more detail the macro
markets on which the hedging instruments are based.
These markets trade perpetual claims on a GDP index.
Trade can take place either over the counter or on an
exchange like the Chicago Board of Trade.
Existing theoretical research has laid out exactly
what will determine prices in markets like these.2 As with
any asset, the price of a claim on a country’s per capita
GDP depends on two factors—expected payoff and risk.
The expected payoff is the expected present discounted
value of future per capita GDP. Risk is measured by the
covariance between the present discounted value of a coun-
try’s per capita GDP and the present discounted value of
the world’s GDP. 
First consider a simple example in a symmetric
world. Two countries have an equal number of residents.
Assume that expected future per capita GDP is the same in
both markets. If we also assume that the variance of the
present discounted value of GDP is the same for both
countries, then the covariance with the world claim will be
identical for the two countries. Claims on the per capita
GDP of both countries therefore will have the same price.
Let us say for the sake of simplicity that the only
traders in these markets are pension funds, and let N be
the size of the population in both markets. Domestic
pension funds will sell   perpetual claims on domestic 1
2
---N
per capita GDP and buy   perpetual claims on foreign
per capita GDP. Because these claims have the same price,
the net cost will be zero. Foreign pension funds take the
other side of the market. The per capita gross domestic
product of the world,  , equals  ,
where   is foreign per capita GDP. Through their
operations in the macro markets, domestic pension funds
have effectively purchased N perpetual claims on
. Because the pension funds also sell N per-
petual claims on   to domestic individuals
through the hedging instrument, domestic pension funds
break even. The same is true for the foreign pension funds.
The two countries have effectively agreed to swap a claim
on half of each other’s GDP. Under this arrangement, there
is no cost or ‘‘insurance premium’’ to reducing risks. After
risk sharing, the residents of both countries will hold
claims on half the domestic country’s per capita GDP plus
half the foreign country’s per capita GDP, which together
add up to world per capita GDP. Residents’ expected aver-
age income is the same as it was before, but the variability
of income is lower.
So far everything in the example is very symmetric.
Now suppose that the domestic country is much larger than
the foreign country: its population N is a hundred times that
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domestic GDP and world GDP will be higher than the cova-
riance between foreign GDP and world GDP, even if the
variance of per capita GDP in both countries is the same.
The price of a perpetual claim on the foreign country’s per
capita GDP will therefore be lower than the price of a claim
on the domestic country’s per capita GDP. 
If the prices of claims on the per capita GDP of
both countries were still equal—as they were when both
countries had the same population—then people in the
larger country would want to swap half their income for
half the per capita income of the people in the smaller
country. But there are not enough people in the smaller
country to take the other side of these transactions. There-
fore, the price of a perpetual claim on the foreign country’s
per capita GDP will be higher than the price of a claim on
the domestic country’s per capita GDP. Consequently, the
people in the larger country will be discouraged from
demanding so many claims on the foreign country, and
market clearing can take place.
In more technical terms, a claim on domestic
per capita GDP can be exchanged for   claims on world
per capita GDP, with  . Through trade in macro
markets, domestic pension funds will buy N claims on
 (with a net price of zero) and sell
those claims as hedging instruments to domestic individu-
als. After the hedge, domestic residents have a perpetual
claim on   times per capita world GDP. Foreign pen-
sion funds will take the other side of the market by selling
N claims on  , which is equivalent to
buying   (the foreign population) claims on
.  Here .  Foreign
pension funds will sell these claims as hedging instruments
to foreign individuals, who will then own a perpetual claim
on   times per capita world GDP. The higher price of a
claim on the foreign country’s output leads to larger
claims on world per capita GDP by foreign residents after
risk sharing.
In the example above, we have assumed for sim-
plicity that all individuals within a country have the same
exposure to their country’s national income risk. In reality,
some individual’s income is more sensitive to national
growth rates than other people’s income. The optimal hedge
a
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position that an investor takes through pension funds or
insurance companies depends on his or her exposure to
national risk. Because people’s exposure to national income
risk differs, limiting trade in claims on a country’s national
income to the residents of that particular country would be
beneficial. Although this limitation would eliminate inter-
national risk sharing, it would allow individuals to share
their exposures to national income risk. Ultimately, through
the appropriate retail institutions, those individuals with
high exposure to national income risk could sell perpetual
claims indexed to national income to those individuals
with low exposure to national income risk. 
THE POTENTIAL RISK-SHARING BENEFITS
Individuals are exposed to many types of aggregate risk. The
most common risks are specific to a sector (occupational
risk), to an age cohort (demographic risk), or to a geographic
area in which someone works (geographic risk). For
example, an auto worker is subject to auto industry risk.
A decline in demand for automobiles will affect the entire
industry. Geographic risk can be linked to a specific
neighborhood or to a whole continent. To measure the
potential diversification benefits of macro markets, we
restrict our analysis to national income risk, abstracting
from other types of aggregate risk. Because we limit our-
selves to national risk, the measure of hedgeable aggregate
income risk derived in this section is lower than the level
achievable through aggregate income markets generally.
Because individuals cannot diversify away global
income growth uncertainty, we focus on country-specific
growth, that is, the difference between a country’s growth
rate and the world growth rate. As explained in the pre-
vious section, macro markets allow individuals to eliminate
the country-specific component of their income growth
uncertainty. We now quantify the size of this uncertainty.3
A REGRESSION MODEL OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
GROWTH UNCERTAINTY
To identify country-specific growth uncertainty, we esti-
mate the following regression for each horizon s: 
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Chart 1
Growth Uncertainty in the OECD Countries
Horizon (years)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The chart shows the standard deviation of the unpredictable compo-
nent of the difference between the per capita GDP growth of a representative 
OECD country and that of the world. The full information set used to predict 
growth consists of thirteen variables (see text). The information set of three 
variables consists of the log of per capita GDP, the fertility rate, and enroll-
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The left-hand side of the equation represents country i’s
growth in real per capita GDP from year t to   minus
global growth in real per capita GDP over the same
period. The first term on the right-hand side of the equa-
tion is the predictable component of the deviation of
country growth from world growth. This component
depends on the relevant information set available to the
market, which is captured by the vector  , in deviation
from its global counterpart. The term u is the unpredict-
able component of the country-specific deviation from
world growth. We also refer to country-specific growth
uncertainty as residual risk.
We apply this regression for various horizons
using panel data for the postwar period (1955-90) from
the Penn World Tables and the Barro and Lee (1994) data
set.4 In our application, we consider two different sets of
countries that engage in risk sharing (and therefore make
up our artificial ‘‘world’’): a set of twenty-one OECD coun-
tries and a more comprehensive set of forty-nine countries
(see appendix). The OECD countries are of interest because
they would likely be the first countries to experiment
with macro markets. Their income risk, however, is likely
to fall below that of developing countries. The larger set of
forty-nine countries provides us with an estimate of the
potential risk-sharing benefits in the event that a broader
array of countries introduced macro markets. Because we
have only one growth observation per country for long
horizons, we are unable to estimate country-specific
growth uncertainty for each country separately. Thus, the
results from the regressions, which combine data from all
the countries in the sample, reflect ‘‘average’’ growth
uncertainty across countries.
In choosing the variables that make up the infor-
mation set, we draw on a large empirical and theoretical
literature on economic growth.5 Our base information set
consists of thirteen variables: the log of per capita GDP;
the most recent one- and five-year growth rates of per
capita GDP; the most recent five-year population growth
rate; the ratio of private consumption to GDP; the ratio of
government consumption to GDP; the ratio of investment
to GDP; openness as measured by exports plus imports as
a fraction of GDP; gross enrollment ratios for primary,
ts +
zit
secondary, and higher education; the fertility rate; and
life expectancy at birth.6 We also consider a smaller infor-
mation set consisting of the three variables with the most
predictive power; that is, they led to the lowest estimated
standard deviation of residual risk at a thirty-five-year
horizon. For the set of forty-nine countries, these variables
are the log of per capita GDP, the fertility rate, and the
investment rate. For the OECD country set, the investment
rate is replaced by enrollment in higher education.
DIVERSIFIABLE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC RISK
Charts 1 and 2 show the standard deviation of residual risk
as a function of the time horizon. For the base information
set, the standard deviation of the growth rate at a thirty-
five-year horizon is 16.4 percent for the set of OECD
countries and 33 percent for the set of forty-nine countries.
These numbers are very large, implying a 95 percent
confidence interval of 66 percent for OECD countries and
132 percent for the forty-nine countries. The charts also
show that the results for the smaller information set are
almost the same as the results for the full information set.
This similarity implies that adding more variables does not
significantly help in predicting long-term growth rates.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 27
Standard deviation
Chart 2
Growth Uncertainty in the Set of Forty-Nine Countries
Horizon (years)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The chart shows the standard deviation of the unpredictable compo-
nent of the difference between the per capita GDP growth of a representative 
country and that of the world. The full information set used to predict growth 
consists of thirteen variables (see text). The information set of three variables 













Per Capita GDP: Best Performing Country 
versus Worst Performing Country
Forty-Nine Countries
Horizon (years)
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
Notes:  The chart shows the probability that the per capita GDP of the best 
performing country will unexpectedly double, triple, quadruple, or quintuple 
relative to that of the worst performing country. These probabilities depend 











To get a better sense of the amount of uncertainty
involved here, we perform a simple experiment. We take
10,000 draws from the distribution of residual risk for
each country,7 assuming that the draws are independent
across countries and that each country’s standard devia-
tion of residual risk is the same. For the set of forty-nine
countries, we use the results to compute the probability
that per capita GDP of the best performing country will
unexpectedly double, triple, quadruple, or quintuple rel-
ative to that of the worst performing country over the
specified time horizon. The results are shown in Chart 3.
The probability that the best performing country’s per
capita GDP doubles or triples relative to that of the worst
performing country is practically 100 percent at the
thirty-five-year horizon. The probability that the best
performing country’s per capita GDP quadruples or quin-
tuples relative to that of the worst performing country is
81 percent and 44 percent, respectively. These results are
striking. They suggest that, after controlling for the
growth that had already been expected, per capita GDP of
the best performing country is likely to rise by a factor of
five relative to that of the worst performing country!
Even at the short ten-year horizon, the probability that
the per capita GDP of the best performing country would
unexpectedly double relative to the per capita GDP of the
worst performing country is 84 percent.
For the set of OECD countries, we report the proba-
bility that the per capita GDP for the best performing
country rises by 30 percent, 50 percent, 70 percent, or
100 percent relative to that of the worst performing country
(Chart 4). At a thirty-five-year horizon, the probabilities are
99.99 percent, 99.9 percent, 61 percent, and 13 percent,
respectively. Although less spectacular, these numbers are still
significant. Indeed, the best performing country’s per capita
GDP is likely to rise by 70 percent relative to the worst
performing country’s over a period of thirty-five years.
Because these figures only consider the very
extremes, that is, the worst compared with the best per-
forming countries, we also compute the probability that
the unweighted average per capita GDP of the seven best
performing countries doubles, triples, quadruples, or quin-
tuples relative to the unweighted average of per capita
GDP of the seven worst performing countries. For the set
of forty-nine countries, at the thirty-five-year horizon the
probabilities are 99.9 percent, 89.4 percent, 29 percent, and
3 percent, respectively. These results suggest that, contrary28 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
Probability
Chart 4
Per Capita GDP: Best Performing Country 
versus Worst Performing Country
OECD Countries
Horizon (years)
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The chart shows the probability that the per capita GDP of the best 
performing country will unexpectedly rise by 30 percent, 50 percent, 
70 percent, or 100 percent relative to that of the worst performing country. 












to expectation, the per capita GDP of the seven best
performing countries as a group is likely to triple relative
to that of the seven worst performing countries over thirty-
five years. For the set of OECD countries, we find a proba-
bility of 88 percent that the unweighted average of per
capita GDP of the three top-performing countries in the
sample rises by 50 percent relative to that of the three
worst performers. Note that in both of these cases we look
at the best performing one-seventh and worst performing
one-seventh of the countries in our sample.
To illustrate further that these numbers are not
unrealistic, Chart 5 shows the expected deviation from world
growth in 1955 for the thirty-five-year period 1955-90
(according to the information set of three variables) com-
pared with the actual deviation from world growth over
the same period. For the set of forty-nine countries, the
best performing countries relative to the expectation in
1955 were Thailand and Japan. Several African and South
American countries were the worst performers. Note that
Thailand was expected to grow slightly less than Uruguay
in 1955. In fact, however, Thailand’s per capita GDP rose
by a factor of 5.1 relative to that of Uruguay! Per capita
GDP of the worst performing country in the sample,
Nicaragua, dropped 22 percent over the period 1955-90.
Some countries that are not in our sample performed even
worse. Extreme cases include Nigeria, whose real per capita
GDP declined 59 percent from 1976 to 1990, and Guyana,
whose real per capita GDP dropped 59 percent from 1976 to
1990. For the world’s poorest countries, hedging national
income risks may truly be a matter of life and death for
some citizens. In these countries, declines in national
income have seriously harmed the quality of health care,
nutrition, environmental protection, and law enforcement.
These results might leave the impression that only
nations in Africa, South America, and East Asia are subject
to large income shocks. Although these countries have
experienced the most dramatic changes in per capita GDP
during the past several decades, what matters today is uncer-
tainty about future income. It is quite possible that over the
next fifty years the biggest income surprises will come from
other parts of the world. Large gains from risk sharing are
therefore not necessarily limited to the set of countries that
have faced the largest income shocks in recent years.
We see from Chart 5 that in our sample of OECD
countries the best performing countries were Japan and
Canada. In 1955, based on various indicators such as low
investment, low school enrollment, high per capita income,
and low recent growth rates, Canada was not expected to
grow as fast as the average OECD country. Nonetheless, its
growth rate turned out to be almost average. The worst
performing countries were Greece, the United Kingdom,
and New Zealand. Japan’s per capita GDP grew 80 percent
more than that of Greece, even though the two countries’
expected growth rates were very similar in 1955. These
results are suggestive of the significant uncertainty of
relative performance among OECD countries. Of course,
we caution against taking the results for individual
countries too literally. The figures are somewhat sensitive
to the precise information set and the countries considered.
Nonetheless, this exercise provides a good sense of the
degree of diversifiable uncertainty of future income. 
Although our sample ends in 1990, a very recent
and large growth surprise surfaced in Ireland. Ireland’s
economy stagnated during the first half of the 1980s. In
1987, its per capita GDP was 63 percent of Britain’s. ButFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 29
Predicted and Actual Deviation from World Growth, 1955-90
Chart 5
Predicted deviation Predicted deviation
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  These figures show the actual and predicted deviation of individual countries’ per capita GDP growth from world per capita GDP growth. Here “world” is defined as 
the sum of the countries in the sample. Countries below the 45 degree line performed better than expected. Countries above the 45 degree line performed worse than expected.
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only nine years later, in 1996, Ireland’s per capita GDP
surpassed Britain’s. The economy expanded 10 percent in
1995 and 7 percent in 1996. Relative to expectations in
the mid-1980s, this remarkable growth episode was clearly
unexpected. Foreign direct investment contributed to
growth, but even now it is hard to fully explain Ireland’s
spectacular growth performance.8
INDIVIDUAL-SPECIFIC RISK
In addition to aggregate income uncertainty, individuals
must contend with income variations that are specific to
their situation. Individual-specific risk cannot be shared
through macro markets. Indeed, no institution can com-
pletely eliminate this type of risk because of moral hazard
problems. How important are these individual risks? How
much income variation is left after people have completely
hedged their aggregate risks?
Fortunately, individual-specific income risk appears
to amount to less than half of total income risk. Shiller and
Schneider (1998), using 1968-87 U.S. data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics, estimate the variance of income
changes that are not under the control of individuals. They
categorize individuals into seven occupational groupings
according to objective factors such as retirement, employ-
ment, and educational status. They then compute an index
of labor income for the United States for each grouping.
The results show that between half and three-quarters of
the variance of five-year income changes can be explained
by the aggregate indexes. Most of people’s income risk
could therefore be managed through macro markets, assum-
ing that they were opened not just on national incomes
but, within that, on occupational incomes.
CAN EXISTING FINANCIAL MARKETS 
DO THE JOB?
In theory, existing financial markets could achieve most
of the potential benefits from diversification if the
aggregate return on domestic financial assets was highly30 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
correlated with the return of a claim on the present
discounted value of aggregate income. This is the case
when the return on human capital is highly correlated
with the return on domestic financial assets. Consider
an average individual whose current wealth consists of
$900,000 in nontraded assets. Nontraded assets include
both human capital and noncorporate business assets,
but, for simplicity, here we will simply refer to both as
human capital. An additional $100,000 of the individual’s
wealth is in financial assets, including pension funds.
Now assume that the return on domestic financial capital
is perfectly correlated with the return on domestic human
capital. The individual can then achieve full diversifica-
tion as follows. First, if the financial return has the same
standard deviation as the human capital return, selling
short domestic financial assets by $900,000 eliminates all
domestic risk. After that, $1 million is invested globally
($100,000 of financial wealth plus the $900,000 of revenue
from selling short domestic assets).
The correlation between the return on human
capital and financial capital, however, is much smaller
than one. Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van Wincoop (1996)
compute this correlation using data for the years 1970-92
for OECD countries. The return on human capital is
defined as the innovation in the present discounted value
of wages divided by the current value of human capital.9
The innovation is computed using the results from a
vector autoregressive process for the wage rate and the
profit rate or for the wage rate and a broad measure of
return on domestic financial capital. A trend is extracted
from both the wage rate and the profit rate. Three
measures of the return on domestic financial capital are
used: the profit rate (profits divided by the capital stock);
the present discounted value of the profit rate, again
using the results from the vector autoregressive process;
and the weighted average of returns on stocks, long-term
bonds, and short-term deposits (a broad measure of financial
returns). Across countries, the average of the estimated
correlation between the return on human capital and
financial capital for the three measures is 0.26, -0.34, and
-0.43, respectively—the correlations are all much smaller
than one.
It is important to note that these correlations are
based on wages and profits after extracting a trend. A
common stochastic growth trend is likely to exist across
countries.10 Because such a common trend represents global
risk, it cannot be shared among countries. Therefore, con-
trolling for such a trend is appropriate for our purposes. It
is useful to note, however, that the negative correlation
for two of the measures is not inconsistent with a positive
correlation between the ‘‘raw’’ returns on human capital
and domestic assets. An improvement in global technol-
ogy raises both profits and wages. 
There are many possible explanations for the
absence of a strong positive correlation. First, shocks to the
bargaining power of labor or a change in government can
significantly affect the income distribution. Second, if
wages are less flexible than prices, positive demand shocks
will affect real wages and profits asymmetrically. Third,
standard trade theory predicts that the wage rate and
return to capital move in opposite directions in response to
terms of trade shocks (Stolper-Samuelson).
An important question that we do not address is
how much of the country-specific income growth uncer-
tainty documented in the preceding section can be shared
through existing financial markets. No research has yet
been done to address that question. Nonetheless, the low
correlations between the return on human capital and
financial assets reported above suggest that macro markets
have an important role to play in the diversification of
aggregate income growth uncertainty, a role that existing
financial markets cannot completely fill.
Macro markets would also allow individuals to
invest in firms and companies that are not traded publicly.
Stock indexes only include companies after they have
become successful. But productivity growth is influenced
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by private firms and start-ups at least as much as by
public companies. Thus, investment in stock indexes
cannot capture the growth of these smaller companies. For
an individual who wants to invest in a country because
the fundamentals of the country are strong, buying a
share of GDP would be more appropriate than buying a
stock index.
WHY DON’T MACRO MARKETS EXIST?
If the potential benefits of aggregate income markets are so
large, and the underlying risk management concepts are
apparently so simple, why have they not already developed
in the private sector? Surely, significant commissions could
be earned if a large demand for these securities developed.
Surely, there ought to be some niche for these securities
somewhere in the world. And yet there is no evidence that
markets like these have ever existed. In principle, macro
markets would not be difficult to introduce. In 1997, the
U.S. Treasury introduced inflation-indexed bonds. The
only essential difference is that in macro markets the
coupons would be indexed to a measure of aggregate
income rather than to the consumer price index (CPI). It is
important, therefore, to try and understand what barriers
stand in the way of the creation of macro markets.
NOT SO OBVIOUS
The first thing to note is that while the concept of risk
management is very basic, the idea of markets that share
income risks is not so obvious as to occur immediately to
most people. The idea of markets in aggregate incomes is
like other important inventions in the history of technol-
ogy that have seemed extremely simple after they were
implemented—simple, that is, from the vantage point of
people viewing the final invention and not the idea that
preceded it. For example, rejecting a proposal for invest-
ment in radio technology in the 1920s, David Sarnoff’s
Associates wrote, ‘‘The wireless music box has no imagin-
able commercial value. Who would pay for a message sent
to nobody in particular?’’ Between 1939 and 1944, more
than twenty companies rejected the idea of Chester Carlson,
inventor of the Xerox machine, to copy a document on
plain paper. Although the idea was considered useless at
the time, today Rank Xerox Corporation earns annual reve-
nues of about $1 billion, and it is hard to imagine life
without the machine.
Establishing markets for long-term claims on
flows of income aggregates is no more obvious than other
recent financial innovations. Even the concept of national
income itself is a relatively new invention that has been
perfected over many years. Developed earlier in this century
by Kuznets (1937), Stone (1947), and others, the concept
of national income as we know it did not become widely
accepted until after World War II.
Similarly, many risk management institutions
that are now commonplace have gotten off to slow starts.
For example, markets in foreign currency swaps—which
now account for about half the gross turnover in the
foreign exchange market—did not develop until the early
1980s. A futures market in stock price indexes also did
not develop until 1982. An even more recent innovation
is the creation of indexed bonds. Economists have been
pointing out the dangers of long-term nominal contracting
for more than a hundred years, and yet in the United
States long-term debt has been almost exclusively nominal.
Indexed federal government debt did not exist in the
United States until 1997, and it still only accounts for
less than 1 percent of the federal debt.11 Brainard and
Dolbaer (1971) have long pointed out the advantages of
creating contracts that allow people to share occupational
income risks, but serious discussion of such contracts has
only just begun.
POTENTIAL FOR FAILURE
Not only do market innovations take a long time to start,
they also often fail. Those who contemplate taking the
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time and effort to establish such markets may be deterred
by past failures. A good example of such a failure is the CPI
futures market, which bears some resemblance to the
macro markets described here.
A CPI futures market allows an investor to hedge
against a change in real income that occurs when nominal
income is rigid and the price level changes. CPI markets
were proposed in the 1970s by Lovell and Vogel (1974) at
a time when U.S. inflation was high. The Lovell-Vogel
proposal launched a discussion of the benefits of the CPI
market, attracting endorsements from such prominent
economists as Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson.
Despite this interest, it took a dozen years before the CPI
market was established in the United States at the Coffee,
Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange in 1985. Unfortunately, by the
time the market was established, the inflation rate (as well
as inflation uncertainty) had fallen to a fairly low level. As
a result, the relatively short-term contracts had virtually no
hedging function. Despite some early activity, the market
was essentially dead by 1986.
The failure of the CPI futures market in the United
States is often cited as evidence that the idea behind the
market was flawed. A CPI market did succeed, however, in
Brazil. The market started around the same time as in the
United States, 1986, but inflation uncertainty was much
higher in Brazil than in the United States. The Brazilian
market flourished until it was shut down by the Brazilian
government as an anti-inflation measure.12 The lesson that
can be learned from the CPI futures market is not that such
markets cannot succeed but that they are slow to get
started. Moreover, they must be started while the risks that
the market is designed to manage are prominent.
LACK OF INVESTOR AWARENESS
It may be that people simply are not aware of long-term
income growth uncertainty and the exposure of their own
incomes to aggregate risk. Investors frequently emphasize
short-term over long-term portfolio performance. One
potential factor behind such a short-term focus is the
agency problem associated with the delegation of finan-
cial market decisions. The difficulty in monitoring
decisions carried out by an outside agency naturally
leads to an overemphasis on easily observable short-term
performance.
Individuals might not be aware of their exposure to
aggregate income growth uncertainty because short-run
fluctuations in their own income often appear to be inde-
pendent of fluctuations in aggregate incomes. This narrow
focus could lead them to underestimate the long-term corre-
lation between individual income and aggregate income.
Most people are probably not aware that over longer time
intervals, individual’s incomes tend to rise and fall with
aggregate income. As we mentioned above, even at the rela-
tively short five-year horizon, most of an individual’s
income growth uncertainty can be attributed to aggregate
risk. Nonetheless, many people attribute these income
fluctuations to their own efforts and abilities as well as to
luck. This lack of awareness raises doubts about whether
large-scale demand in macro markets would ultimately
materialize, even though in principle the diversification
benefits are high.
LACK OF PRICE HISTORY
We have yet to find a single example of a mutual fund that
advertises a low or negative correlation of its returns with
income aggregates as one of its selling points—even
though finance theory suggests that such a correlation is
one of the most important things to advertise. One expla-
nation for the failure of mutual funds to advertise such a
correlation is that claims on income aggregates have no
market price and therefore no observable return. No one
knows how volatile the price of aggregate income claims
would be. Only the history of the income movements
themselves is observable. Consider the case of investors
who own corporate stock. If individuals could observe only
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dividend announcements and not the price, no one would
know the amount of volatility present in stock prices.13
THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC DEBATE 
AND LEADERSHIP
One reason aggregate income markets do not exist is that
there has been very little public debate about the potential
goals of such markets. Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and
Sundén (1996) find that friends and relatives are the most
important source of financial advice. Others’ actions clearly
provide an important signal for most people. Thus, a broad
consensus on the value of macro markets among financial
advisors, writers, commentators, lawyers, regulators, and
lawmakers is very important if risk management contracts
are to be sold to the public. Historical evidence suggests
that professional leadership is an important factor in mak-
ing risk management institutions a success. Consider, for
example, disability risk insurance. In the early part of this
century, private disability insurance was available but the
public showed little interest in it. Only through the work
of economists—notably John R. Commons, a cofounder of
the American Economic Association—did the state-
government institution of Worker’s Compensation become
established in the United States in all but six states by
1920.14 Since then, disability insurance has become com-
mon among private employers as well. Today, disability
insurance is a well-established institution that is not
exclusively governmental, even though relatively little
disability insurance is sold directly to individuals by
insurance companies.
A PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM
Another reason why these securities may not exist is that
market innovators typically capture a very small fraction of
the benefits and almost all of the costs of introducing a new
market. Financial instruments or ways of doing business
usually cannot be patented. Evidence indicates that when a
firm successfully issues a new financial product, a competi-
tor typically introduces a similar product within a period
of less than two or three months.15 At the same time, the
introduction of aggregate income assets requires substan-
tial initial investments from the innovator, including data
collection, publicizing the product, experimenting with
different types of contracts, and educating the public on
how to use these markets.
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
What these contracts should cash-settle on is a serious issue
that poses significant measurement problems. Per capita
income measures can change based on shifting demo-
graphics alone. One solution may be to keep track of the
incomes of a large group of individuals. Changes in quality
are also notoriously hard to measure. Beyond such measure-
ment issues is the question of how to deal with revisions.
Shiller (1993) advances the theory of index numbers to
address these questions. He proposes several kinds of chain
indexes that are relatively robust to revision problems, and
adjustments to national income measures could be made
along these lines. Attempts to generate labor income
indexes that are less sensitive to the changing composi-
tion of the labor force are reported in Shiller and
Schneider (1998). The standardization of the indexes is
essential to creating liquidity in these markets. A related
problem is that governments collect most of the data to
compute these indexes. If countries sell short claims on
their own income, which they should do for the purpose
of risk sharing, governments have an incentive to under-
report GDP. It is not immediately clear how to resolve
the problem of underreporting, although similar problems
have not stopped the development of markets in indexed
bonds and CPI futures.
PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
Enforceability may also be a significant obstacle. In the for-
mation of macro markets, contract designers need to avoid
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incentives for investors to renege on contracts. Consider the
hedging instruments discussed earlier, which yield an
annual payoff of  . Domestic residents buy
such securities from pension funds to eliminate their expo-
sure to country-specific aggregate risk. But when per capita
output in their own country unexpectedly grows faster
than per capita world output, they lose on the contract. In
order to guarantee their ability to pay, domestic residents
must put up margin. These margin calls can be very large
because the expected present discounted value of a coun-
try’s per capita GDP can fluctuate widely. The amount of
margin required shrinks as the margin is adjusted more fre-
quently because at shorter time intervals the uncertainty
about asset price changes is smaller. Nonetheless, as we saw
in October 1987 and October 1997, sometimes very large
asset price changes are observed even over very short periods
of time. High levels of margin may push individuals who
do not have sufficient liquid assets out of the market. One
advantage of arranging these contracts through pension
funds is that the money already invested in the fund can be
applied as margin. Very young investors—whose pension
accounts are still small—may not be able to fully diversify
against aggregate income risk. This problem gradually
improves as an investor gets older. Most middle-aged
people have accumulated sufficient wealth to take full
advantage of the option to hedge aggregate risk. But as an
investor gets older, the horizon for hedging becomes
shorter and the benefits from risk sharing decrease.
MACRO MARKET BUBBLES
An additional problem is that the price of the macro
securities may be even more volatile than the underlying
fundamentals. Asset price bubbles cannot be ruled out. An
asset price bubble occurs when increasing optimism causes
investors to bid up prices to unsustainable levels, eventu-
ally resulting in a bursting of the bubble and a sudden
crash. By some accounts, bubbles are caused in part by
individuals who overreact to past positive returns and flock
into a bull market. Investors who enter the market because
of excessive optimism typically choose to depart once they
find that their optimism is unfounded and can cause a
market to crash.
GDPW GDP –
Stock market crashes have sometimes had signifi-
cant repercussions on economic performance. The world-
wide stock market crash of 1929, for example, appears to
have triggered a public sense of great uncertainty and a
desire to postpone expenditures until the economic outlook
grew clearer (see Romer [1990]). This reaction may have
been a factor in bringing on the Great Depression. The
consequences of such price swings in macro markets, and
safety measures to protect against such shocks, need to be
considered and addressed. 
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
Finally, we would like to address a very practical question.
Given the uncertainties surrounding a person’s future
income, future employment, and future career develop-
ments, how will he or she know what positions to take in
these markets? In our earlier example, we assumed that the
individual’s wages are equal to the per capita wage rate
plus an idiosyncratic component unrelated to aggregate risk.
But in reality, some people’s income is more exposed to the
national business cycle than others’. This exposure depends
on the location of someone’s work as well as the sector in
which he or she works. In general, the optimal positions in
the aggregate income markets depend on how much one’s
future income is correlated with measures of aggregate
income over long-term horizons. Depending on the sector
and location of someone’s work, information about long-
term income fluctuations can be obtained from historical
data. But what happens when someone moves to another
part of the country or to another sector, or when someone
changes careers altogether? Of course, every person’s career
has a significant idiosyncratic component. What is really
needed, however, is a good estimate of the aggregate
component of a person’s future income that takes into
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consideration characteristics such as age, education, location,
and the sector in which he or she works. Financial advisors
can use this information, which can be obtained from
longitudinal data sources, to determine optimal hedging
strategies. Obtaining such measures of covariances is a very
difficult task. We do not want to exaggerate this difficulty,
however. Over longer horizons, which matter most for
diversification purposes, people’s incomes are more cor-
related than they are over short horizons. In the end,
almost all people are sensitive to the growth performance
of the aggregate economy, no matter where or in what
sector they work.
CONCLUSION
We have outlined how macro markets can be beneficial to
the average person interested in his or her long-term
financial security. The introduction of such markets
allows pension funds to offer a hedging instrument that
can be used to reduce, or even eliminate, exposure to
country-specific growth performance. We have found that
the benefits of eliminating exposure to such country-
specific risk are large. Over a period of thirty-five years, the
per capita GDP of one industrialized country relative to
that of another industrialized country could unexpect-
edly double. For a broader group of countries, the risks are
much larger. While not documented in this paper, large
gains are likely to be achieved by trading other forms of
aggregate income claims, particularly those associated with
occupational risks. We have also pointed out that existing
financial markets are not a good substitute for macro
markets that cash-settle on a measure of national income.
Given that macro markets can provide substantial
improvements in long-term financial security—improve-
ments that cannot be achieved in existing markets—it may
seem peculiar that these markets have not yet developed.
We offer several explanations for the absence of macro
markets. Investors tend to be focused on short-term
financial performance and may not consider the benefits
of long-term financial security. Moreover, research has
shown that for most people, friends and family represent
the main source of financial advice. It is therefore
unlikely that investors will consider the benefits of pro-
tecting themselves from country-specific risks until a
broad consensus develops on the value of macro markets
among financial advisors, writers, lawyers, the media,
regulators, and lawmakers.
Before aggregate income contracts can be intro-
duced, many practical hurdles must be overcome. Rules for
settlement need to be developed, and decisions must be
made about income measures, contract size, and margin
requirements. Circuit breakers or other measures that deal
with the possibility of sudden booms or crashes in the
macro markets will be necessary. An array of regulatory and
tax issues will need to be resolved. Perhaps most impor-
tant, methods for evaluating the aggregate income risk
exposure of individual households and businesses will need
to be developed so that people will know how to use the
markets. Given the costs of introducing such markets, it is
also important to think about where the first markets
should be created and whether initial markets should be for
individual countries or for aggregates of countries.16
Some of the hurdles to a wide-scale use of macro
markets could turn out to be too large. Margin requirements
to enforce the contracts may be too big for many individ-
uals. It may also be difficult to determine optimal exposure
to aggregate income risk for individual people and to con-
vince investors of the benefits of hedging this risk. Even if
these markets are eventually introduced, they may be used
more narrowly than has been suggested here. The presence
of these obstacles, however, does not mean that we should
avoid serious debate about the creation of aggregate
income markets. Aggregate income growth uncertainty
represents the largest macroeconomic risk incurred by
households all over the world. The benefits from trading in
macro markets are potentially very large. Factors that are
essential to the start of such markets—including well-
functioning financial exchanges, a sophisticated technology
of trading, and the intellectual appreciation of the impor-
tance of risk management—are already in place. Eventually,
portfolio managers and individuals could routinely hedge
aggregate income risks in macro markets.36 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 APPENDIX
We use two sets of countries in the regression analysis—a
set of forty-nine countries and a smaller set of twenty-one
OECD countries. 
The forty-nine countries are Kenya, Mauritius,
Uganda, Canada, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Japan, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
New Zealand. 
The twenty-one OECD countries are Canada, the
United States, Japan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
APPENDIX:  TWO SETS OF COUNTRIESENDNOTES
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1. See Kang and Stulz (1997), French and Poterba (1991), and Tesar
and Werner (1994, 1997).
2. See Shiller and Athanasoulis (1995) and Athanasoulis and Shiller
(1997); for related work, see also Demange and Laroque (1995) and Allen
and Gale (1994).
3. The country-specific growth uncertainty can also be transformed
into a measure of welfare gains from international risk sharing. See
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1999) and van Wincoop (1994, 1996,
1999).
4. See Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1997) for details on the
estimation procedure. For each horizon s, we use data for all non-
overlapping intervals with that length, starting with the most recent
interval ending in 1990.
5. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Levine and Renelt (1992).
6. We experimented with additional variables: political instability;
terms of trade growth over the past five years; percentage of primary,
secondary, and higher education attained; the most recent one-year and
five-year growth rates of private consumption; and the investment rate
averaged over the past five years. None of these variables improved
predictive power substantially.
7. The residual risk is based on the three variables that have the most
predictive power.
8. See The Economist, May 17-23, 1997, pp. 21-4, for a discussion of
Ireland’s recent growth.
9. The wage rate is the average real wage per employee using national
data on employee compensation divided by the number of employees and
the consumer price index.
10. Plenty of evidence suggests that technological convergence occurs
across industrialized countries, leading to a common stochastic growth
trend.
11. See Shiller (1997) for a discussion of public resistance to indexation.
12. Similar markets were reintroduced twice in the late 1980s.
However, each time they were eventually shut down by the government.
13. This problem is not insurmountable. Initial public offerings face the
same problem.
14. See Moss (1995).
15. See Tufano (1992).
16. Shiller and Athanasoulis (1995) find that a U.S.-Japan swap of
national incomes may be the best single contract to recommend, with a
U.S.-Europe swap being important as well. Athanasoulis and Shiller
(1997) find that an important market to develop early would be a market
for the entire world, a market that would trade claims on the aggregated
incomes of all countries.38 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 NOTES
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